Orbitofrontal Cortex Assigns Credit Wisely  by Seo, Hyojung & Lee, Daeyeol
Neuron
PreviewsOrbitofrontal Cortex Assigns Credit WiselyHyojung Seo1,* and Daeyeol Lee1,*
1Department of Neurobiology, Yale University School of Medicine, New Haven, CT 06510, USA
*Correspondence: hyojung.seo@yale.edu (H.S.), daeyeol.lee@yale.edu (D.L.)
DOI 10.1016/j.neuron.2010.03.016
Damage in the orbitofrontal cortex impairs the ability to switch behaviors when their outcomes change, but
the cause of these deficits remained unknown. In this issue ofNeuron, Walton et al. demonstrate a key role of
the primate orbitofrontal cortex in disambiguating the relationship between multiple choices and their
outcomes.Figure 1. Temporal Credit Assignment in Two Different Types of Decision-Making Tasks
(A) An agent is repeatedly placed in a start box and is required to discover the shortest path leading to the
goal box (indicated by an apple). When multiple actions need to be performed to acquire reward as in this
maze, eligibility traces for previous actions can facilitate the process of discovering the optimal sequence
of actions by updating the value functions for multiple actions simultaneously.
(B)When the correct actions are determined entirely by the stimuli (states) presented in individual trials, the
outcome of each action should influence only the choice made in the same trial. In this case, the use of
eligibility trace is not optimal. Top panels show the structure of each task, and bottom panels show an
example sequence of actions in each task.Animals need to analyze a variety of infor-
mation about the outcomes expected
from alternative actions in order to obtain
the outcomes that are most beneficial. In
most cases, this is an ill-posed problem,
since the animals seldom have the accu-
rate and complete knowledge about their
environment. Therefore, abilities to im-
prove the predictions about the action
outcomes through experience are essen-
tial for survival. A major difficulty in this
reinforcement learning arises because
outcomes resulting from the animal’s
actions are often temporally delayed.
Moreover, animals often need to produce
a series of actions to obtain a desired
outcome (Figure 1A). As a result, when
the animal receives reward at a particular
moment, which subset of its recent
actions was responsible for the reward
may not be obvious, creating a so-called
temporal credit-assignment problem
(Sutton and Barto, 1998). A study by Wal-
ton, Behrens, and their colleagues in this
issue of Neuron (Walton et al., 2010)
suggests that the orbitofrontal cortex
(OFC) might make an important contribu-
tion to solving this problem.
Theories of reinforcement learning
postulate that, during decision making,
actions are chosen so as to maximize
the estimate of future rewards expected
from them (Sutton and Barto, 1998).
These estimates of future rewards are
referred to as value functions, and many
algorithms have been proposed to specify
how they should be updated through
experience. A well-known temporal differ-
ence (TD) learning algorithm, for example,
updates the value functions according to
the discrepancy between the reward
received at a particular moment and the
reward predicted by its current value
functions (Sutton and Barto, 1998). Since736 Neuron 65, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevthe value functions are updated one at a
time, this learning can be slow. To expe-
dite learning, simple TD learning algo-
rithms can be augmented by the memory
about previous states and actions, which
are referred to as eligibility traces. Some
reinforcement learning algorithms use
eligibility traces to update the value
functions for multiple states and actions
simultaneously (Figure 1A). It should be
emphasized that the use of eligibility
traces may not always be optimal. If the
outcome in each trial is independent of
previous states and actions, then theier Inc.use of eligibility trace can be detrimental
to learning correct actions for different
states (Figure 1B). In such cases, the
agent should update the value functions
for individual actions separately using
only the information about their imme-
diate outcomes. Therefore, the use of
eligibility traces needs to be tailored to
the structures of specific tasks. The study
by Walton et al. (2010) suggests that this
ability to use eligibility traces adaptively
might be compromised by OFC lesions.
Previous studies have suggested that
the OFC is important for reinforcement
Figure 2. Orbitofrontal Cortex and Reversal Learning
(A) Hypothetical sequence of choices (top) and their outcomes (bottom) during
reversal learning before and after reversal (dotted line) in normal animals.
Objects ‘‘A’’ and ‘‘B’’ indicate the correct choices before and after the reversal,
respectively. Rewards (apples) reinforce only the immediately preceding
choices.
(B) Hypothetical sequence of choices and outcomes during reversal learning in
animals with OFC lesions. When the animal chooses the correct object for the
first time after the reversal (‘‘B’’), the reward reinforces not only the correct
action but also other choices through eligibility traces and other unknown
mechanisms (red dotted arrows).
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(Iversen and Mishkin, 1970;
Izquierdo et al., 2004; Wallis,
2007; Rolls and Grabenhorst,
2008; Schoenbaum et al.,
2009). Monkeys with OFC
lesions are not impaired in
the initial phase of an object
discrimination task in which
they are required to learn
which of the two objects is
associatedwith reward.Com-
pared to control animals,
however, they are impaired in
learning to choose the correct
object, when previously re-
warded and unrewarded
objects are switched. The
precise cause of this deficit
is unknown, although two dif-
ferent theories have been
proposed. First, OFC lesions
might impair the animal’s
ability to switch their behav-ioral strategies flexibly and instead cause
them to perseverate with previously rein-
forced behaviors. Second, OFC lesions
might reduce the animal’s sensitivity to
the reward omission. Surprisingly, the
findings by Walton et al. (2010) suggest
that neither of these explanations can
account for the behavioral deficit created
by OFC lesions.
To determine the role of OFC in rein-
forcement learning, Walton and his col-
leagues tested rhesus monkeys with and
without OFC lesions in a free-choice
task with three options (hence referred
to as three-armed bandit task) in which
the probability of reward for choosing
each of three different visual objects was
changed gradually. For each testing
session, three novel objects were intro-
duced, and two of them were associated
with high and low reward probabilities.
During the first half of each session, the
third object was never rewarded, but the
reward probability for the best option fluc-
tuated substantially (see their Figure 1D).
In the second half of each session, the
best and worst objects switched their
roles so that the object never rewarded
in the first half of the session was now
rewarded most frequently. Consistent
with the findings from previous studies,
animals with OFC lesions initially learned
to choose the best option equally well
compared to the control animals. Similarto the previous findings, OFC-lesioned
animals also failed to increase the fre-
quency of choosing the new best option
in the secondhalf of the session.However,
they adjusted the frequency of choosing
the best option as its reward probability
fluctuated during the first half of the
session just as well as the control animals,
suggesting that the learning impairments
in the second half of the session might
not be due to the failures in detecting
reward omission or switching away from
unprofitable behaviors.
Through a series of elegant analyses,
Walton and colleague provide an alterna-
tive account as to why the animals with
OFC lesions display such paradoxical
patterns of behaviors. According to this
novel hypothesis, OFC lesions impair the
animal’s ability to attribute the delivery
or omission of reward to the behavior
responsible for that outcome correctly.
Since the behavioral task used in the
study byWalton et al. consisted of a series
of independent trials (Figure 1B), the
reward received by the animal in a given
trial should selectively increase the
frequency of repeating the choice made
in that trial only. Choices made by the
animal during the preceding and subse-
quent trials should be ignored. Interest-
ingly, during the task used by Walton
et al., the effect of reward in a given
trial spread to the animal’s choices inNeuron 65, March 25,neighboring trials. While this
was true for both control and
OFC-lesioned animals, the
control animals were little
affected by this misattribu-
tion, since their choices were
influenced more strongly by
their immediate outcomes.
The OFC might facilitate the
process of forming appro-
priate associations between
actions and their correspond-
ing outcomes by maintaining
active representations of
most recent actions and
outcomes (Frank and Claus,
2006; Lara et al., 2009; Wallis,
2007). Indeed, neurons in the
primate OFC often modulate
their activity according to
the animal’s choice immedi-
ately before its outcome is
revealed (Tsujimoto et al.,
2009).The findings by Walton and colleagues
suggest that OFC lesions might unmask
the effect of eligibility traces associated
with multiple actions taken prior to the
choice responsible for the desired out-
come. In addition to accounting for the
results from their own study, this can
also provide an explanation for the com-
monly observed deficit in reversal learning
following OFC lesions. Immediately after
rewarded and unrewarded objects are
switched during reversal learning tasks,
both control and OFC-lesioned animals
will choose the object that is no longer
rewarded. When the control animals
eventually choose the correct object, the
value function for this action will be selec-
tively increased, making the animal more
likely to choose the correct object again
(Figure 2A). In contrast, the reward
received by the OFC-lesioned animals
will increase the value functions for mul-
tiple actions taken by the animal in pre-
vious trials according to their eligibility
traces, keeping the value function for
choosing the incorrect object at a higher
level (Figure 2B).
The hypothesis proposed by Walton
and colleagues requires that brain areas
other than the OFC implement the learn-
ing mechanisms equipped with eligibility
traces. Such brain areas might contain
neurons that display persistent activity
related to the animal’s previous choices2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 737
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coding the outcomes in multiple trials
might provide the substrate for erroneous
associations between actions and earlier
outcomes. Indeed, neurons thatmodulate
their activity according to the animal’s
previous choices and their outcomes are
often found in multiple brain areas, in-
cluding the prefrontal cortex, posterior
parietal cortex, and the basal ganglia
(Barraclough et al., 2004; Seo et al.,
2009; Kim et al., 2009). In addition, most
of these brain regions also include neu-
rons that are tuned for specific action-
outcome conjunctions, which might be
used to resolve the ambiguity in linking
individual actions and their corresponding
outcomes appropriately (Uchida et al.,
2007; Seo and Lee, 2009). However,
whether and how the OFC contributes to
or benefits from the neural signals related
to specific action-outcome conjunctions
is unknown.
In summary, Walton and colleagues
have provided valuable insight into the
questionofwhatcharacterizes the function738 Neuron 65, March 25, 2010 ª2010 Elsevof the OFC. It may be difficult to define
concisely the functions of brain areas as
extensive and heterogeneous as the
OFC. Nevertheless, the hypothesis put
forward by these authors parsimoniously
explains the empirical observations re-
ported in the literature as well as their
new findings, demanding future lesion
studies to test its predictions with different
behavioral paradigms as well as computa-
tional and neurophysiological studies to
focus on the circuit mechanisms respon-
sible for solving the problem of temporal
credit assignment flexibly.REFERENCES
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